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‘Am I Free Now?’  
Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery 
 
Virginia Mantouvalou 
 
 
This article examines the United Kingdom’s overseas domestic worker and diplomatic 
domestic worker visas in place since 2012. These visas tie workers to an employer by 
making it unlawful for them to change employer, even if they have been seriously 
exploited or abused. The article presents the findings of a qualitative study, a series of 
semi-structured interviews of overseas domestic workers. It explores how this 
vulnerable and difficult (for researchers) to reach group of workers experience these 
visas in practice. The workers reported instances of exploitation and abuse by the 
employers with whom they arrived in the UK. Having escaped abusive employers they 
have become undocumented, and report being trapped in ongoing cycles of 
exploitation. The article assesses what light this empirical exploration sheds on the 
question whether the visa is contrary to the prohibition of slavery, servitude, forced 
and compulsory labour in article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
‘[The employers] did not give me to eat. Only once a day, limited food. I was hungry. 
That is why I said I made a sacrifice: you need to work, you sacrifice everything’.  
(Geraldine, overseas domestic worker) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Why would anyone in a society that values freedom feel required to sacrifice the 
satisfaction of basic needs in order to work? Should a liberal state tolerate such a 
situation? With these questions in the background, in this article, I explore the United 
Kingdom’s Overseas Domestic Worker (ODW) and diplomatic domestic worker visas 
in place since 2012, which tie workers to an employer by making it unlawful for them 
to change employer, even if they have been seriously exploited or abused. It has been 
suggested that these visas create situations of vulnerability that may lead to grave 
restrictions on freedom, which can also be classified as slavery or servitude. 1 
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Nevertheless, the UK Modern Slavery Act that received royal ascent in 2015 left the 
visa regime intact, even though it had become a crucial political issue and severe 
criticisms had been expressed at various stages of the parliamentary debates.2 The 
House of Commons rejected an amendment to the Bill, proposed in the House of 
Lords which would have protected migrant domestic workers admitted to the UK 
under the ODW and diplomatic visas. Baroness Butler-Sloss called the proposed 
amendment ‘almost blackmail’,3  because of the perceived risk that the Bill would be 
entirely blocked as a result of the disagreement between the two Houses on the issue 
of the amendment to the ODW visa. Eventually, however, the Bill was passed, 
leaving the domestic workers visa unreformed in spite of a Commons’ Amendment, 
and therefore leaving these workers exposed to exploitation owing to their inability to 
quit and find another employer.  
 
The Modern Slavery Act 2015 codifies and consolidates existing offences, increases 
sentences for most serious offenders, introduces Slavery and Trafficking Prevention 
and Risk Orders, sets up the institution of an Anti-Slavery Commissioner, contains 
some provisions on protection of victims, and includes a section on businesses and 
transparency in global supply chains. The question to be examined here is whether the 
failure to include any significant reform to the domestic workers visa regime in the 
Act leads to the conclusion that, ironically, it in fact preserved rather than eradicated 
one instance of slavery.  
 
For the purposes of the present article, I undertook a qualitative study, conducting a 
series of semi-structured interviews of overseas domestic workers. This was a first 
step in an attempt to explore how this vulnerable and difficult (for researchers) to 
reach group of workers experience these visas in practice, to examine if any of them 
are now undocumented because they escaped their employer, and to assess what light 
this empirical exploration sheds on the classification of the visa as one of 
enslavement. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. Before presenting the findings of the 
interviews, the article explains the meaning of domestic work and the challenges for 
its legal regulation, as well as the details and history of the ODW and diplomatic 
visas. I then turn to the question of how domestic workers experience these visas in 
practice in light of their interviews. The article presents some features of the group, 
explores their living and working conditions, their fears and hopes. According to the 
interviews, there is a pattern of exploitation and even physical abuse before the 
domestic workers arrive in the UK. This situation does not improve after arrival; 
indeed it sometimes deteriorates. Almost all interviewees are now undocumented 
migrants. Despite the exploitation and abuse that these workers report experiencing, 
by escaping from their employer they lost their legal status and all rights attached to 
it, on account of these very restrictive immigration rules. Moreover, the interviews 
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indicate that these workers are trapped in ongoing cycles of exploitation by 
subsequent employers who know about their status as undocumented migrants. It can, 
therefore, be said that the domestic workers visas, which do not permit workers to 
change employer lawfully, lead to the creation of an extremely vulnerable group of 
undocumented migrants that are prone to exploitation. In light of this empirical 
exploration, the article assesses afresh whether this visa can be classified as a visa of 
enslavement in breach of article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) that prohibits slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour, and 
discusses some of the legal implications of this classification.  
 
 
 
 
PAID DOMESTIC WORK TODAY 
 
Paid domestic work is on the rise for many reasons, such as income inequality, the 
increased participation of women in the labour market outside home and the 
marketisation of care provision in many countries. 4  Domestic workers are those 
undertaking various household tasks, such as cleaning, cooking, caring for children or 
the elderly. They are sometimes employed part-time, working for a few hours a day 
for different employers and sometimes full-time by one employer. Some domestic 
workers live in the employers’ household. These live-in domestic workers are mostly 
migrants, both in the Western world and elsewhere. 5  They migrate to work as 
domestic workers and send income generated through their work back to their 
families.6 This group of workers face challenges that other migrant workers may also 
face, such as language barriers, lack of friends and family in the destination country, 
lack of knowledge of existing networks of support and of their legal rights. For 
domestic workers these problems are accentuated: building new networks is almost 
impossible for those with very limited possibilities to develop social relations at work.                                   
 
The great majority of domestic workers are women.7 Without paid domestic workers, 
the labour force would look different today because the women that have historically 
been in charge of household tasks, such as care work and cleaning, would not be able 
to work outside the home. Domestic work may set challenges to feminist thought. 
John Stuart Mill drew an analogy between women’s treatment by the law in the 19th 
century and slavery, partly because women had no right to work outside the home.8 
Today, women participate in the labour market outside the home. This is of course 
desirable because they achieve greater equality to men. But to do this they often have 
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para. 20. For analysis, see B. Anderson, Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic 
Labour (2000). 
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to employ other, migrant women to work at home.9 This is why it has been suggested 
that the feminist project is unfinished.10 
 
Domestic labour is notoriously difficult to regulate. The working conditions of 
domestic workers are special, in that they work in the household of the employer, 
away from the public eye. They are not visible to the authorities and are not easily 
accessible by labour inspectors. When they are live-in domestic workers, the 
employer’s house is also their home, so their private space and time is even harder to 
measure.11 Moreover, in part because they are very hard to access, domestic workers 
are generally under-unionised.12 
 
In addition to the difficulties that stem from the nature of the job, domestic work is a 
disadvantaged sector of the labour market. Domestic workers are excluded from much 
labour protective legislation in many legal orders. In the UK, for example, domestic 
work is excluded from the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974,13 for reasons that 
involve the protection of the privacy of the employer’s household. Regulation 19 of 
the Working Time Regulations excludes domestic workers in private homes from the 
majority of Regulations 4-8 on maximum weekly working time, maximum working 
time for young workers, length of night work, night work by young workers, and 
restrictions on the patterns of work that can be set by employers when there is risk to 
the health and safety of a worker. 14  Domestic workers are also excluded from 
minimum wage regulation, when the domestic worker is viewed as a ‘member of the 
family’.15 Elsewhere I have described the exclusion from protective laws or special 
regulation of this work sector as the ‘legislative precariousness of domestic 
workers’.16 This disadvantage is not just a recent phenomenon. It has been argued that 
it is rooted in the category of ‘domestic servant’ and ‘menial servant’ in English law, 
a class of worker which historically received separate regulation.17 Paid domestic 
work is essential in the modern world, and many domestic workers are treated with 
respect. Exploitation is not endemic in domestic labour. Yet domestic workers are 
prone to exploitation because of the particularities of the job and their treatment by 
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Trade Union Option’ (2014) 153 International Labour Rev. 93-116. See also E. Albin and V. 
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Attempts in Israel and the UK’ (2015) Theoretical Inquiries in Law, forthcoming. 
13 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, section 51. 
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 5 
the law. 
 
In recent years, the domestic work sector has attracted significant attention in many 
national and supranational fora. 18  Perhaps the most significant development at 
international level was the adoption of the 2011 International Labour Organisation 
Convention No 189 and Recommendation No 201 on Domestic Workers, which 
contain concrete safeguards for this vulnerable work sector. Domestic workers and 
their organizations welcomed the Convention with enthusiasm. Academic scholarship 
was equally welcoming.19 The Convention was viewed as a positive development for 
bringing this disadvantaged work sector from the shadows of labour market regulation 
to the light and presenting domestic workers’ rights as human rights, while also 
targeting the particularities of the sector. 20 The legal instruments were adopted with 
wide support (396 votes in favour, 16 against and 63 abstentions), but the UK 
abstained in the vote. The UK Government representative said: ‘we do not consider it 
appropriate, or practical, to extend criminal health and safety legislation, including 
inspections, to cover private households employing domestic workers. It would be 
difficult, for instance, to hold elderly individuals, who employ carers, to the same 
standards as large companies’.21  
 
 
 
OVERSEAS DOMESTIC WORKER AND DIPLOMATIC VISA 
 
Against this background of the legislative precariousness of domestic labour as well 
as some political hostility against this disadvantaged work sector, this section 
examines the ODW and diplomatic visas, both of which tie the worker to the 
employer, in that the worker does not have a right to change employer. Since workers 
from the European Economic Area (EEA) have freedom of movement, it is only non-
EEA citizens that are affected by the visas. 
 
The ODW visa is not entirely new. Previously, until 1998, when migrant domestic 
workers arrived lawfully in the country accompanying an employer, they entered 
under a concession that tied them to this employer. Their residency status was lawful 
for as long as the employer with whom they entered the country employed them, with 
the result that the employer gained important means to control them. The wish of 
certain visitors coming into the UK to be accompanied by domestic workers, 
stemming from the personal relationship developed between them and the workers, 
together with the wish of domestic workers to retain their job while their employers 
                                                        
18 See G. Mundlak and H. Shamir, ‘The Global Governance of Domestic Work’, in Migration and 
Care Labour, eds. B. Anderson and I. Shutes (2014); A. Blackett, ‘The Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers Convention and Recommendation 2011’ (2012) 106 Am. J. of International Law 778-794 at 
781-782; 
19 E. Albin and V. Mantouvalou, ‘The ILO Convention on Domestic Workers: From the Shadows to 
the Light’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law J. 67-78; A. Blackett, id.; S. Fredman, ‘Home from Home: Migrant 
Domestic Workers and the International Labour Organisation Convention on Domestic Workers’, in 
Migrants at Work, eds. C. Costello and M. Freedland (2014); M. Oelz, ‘The ILO’s Domestic Workers 
Convention and Recommendation: A Window of Opportunity for Social Justice’ (2014) 153 
International Labour Rev. 143-172. 
20 Albin and Mantouvalou, id.  
21 Statement by Ms Warwick, International Labour Conference Record of Proceedings 15 June 2011, 
25 (rev), 22). 
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are abroad for a short period of time, explains why provision was made for overseas 
domestic workers in the UK immigration system.  
 
In parliamentary debates, the concession from the standard immigration routes was 
described as a matter of national interest: ‘Looking at our national interest, if wealthy 
investors, skilled workers and others with the potential to benefit our economy were 
unable to be accompanied by their domestic staff they might not come here at all but 
take their money and skills to other countries only too keen to welcome them.’22 At 
the same time, when the concession was introduced for domestic workers from 
overseas, a humanitarian reason was also put forward: ‘Domestic workers who were 
unable to accompany the household to the UK could well lose their jobs, their homes 
and their livelihoods.’23  
This situation changed in 1998, when immigration rules allowed domestic workers to 
change employers (but not work sector). The 1998 change was the important outcome 
of a campaign by domestic workers, trade unions and other civil society organisations 
that supported them, which highlighted how domestic workers can be active agents.24 
Under the regime of 1998, there were two types of overseas domestic worker visas: 
one for workers employed in private households, and another for those employed in 
diplomatic households. A domestic worker who had been employed by his or her 
employer for at least one year abroad could accompany a foreign national who 
entered the country for a period of six or 12 months. After five years, the worker 
could apply for settlement. Even though the domestic worker had entered the country 
with a specific employer, he or she was not tied to that employer. The worker could 
change employer but not work sector. The impact of this route of immigration on net 
migration was negligible. According to UK Border Agency data, less than 5 per cent 
of domestic workers who entered under an ODW visa went on to settle in the country. 
In 2009, only 0.5 per cent of those awarded settlement in the UK were migrant 
domestic workers.25 
 
The Draft International Labour Organisation Multilateral Framework on Labour 
Migration of 200526 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 
cited the 1998 ODW visa as best practice.27 In the UK, it was viewed as an important 
safeguard against trafficking in human beings.28 If domestic workers were ill-treated 
by the employer with whom they entered the country, they could move to another 
employer. The ability to change employer was an important safeguard for overseas 
domestic workers who would otherwise be totally dependent on the employer with 
whom they arrived.  
 
However, in 2012 the Government introduced a visa regime that does not permit 
domestic workers to change employer. This change occurred against the background 
of the so-called Points-Based-System. Under this system, the policy is to not grant 
                                                        
22 Lord Reay, 28 November 1990, Hansard Col. 1052. 
23 id. 
24 See Albin and Mantouvalou, op. cit., n. 12. 
25 M. Lalani, Ending the Abuse – Policies that Work to Protect Migrant Domestic Workers (2011). 
26  Draft ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, available at 
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb295/pdf/tmmflm-1.pdf> para. 82. 
27 See <http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4c0623e92>, paras. 60-61. 
28 Home Affairs Committee, The Trade in Human Beings: Human Trafficking in the UK, Sixth Report 
of Session 2008-2009, Volume I, 9 June 2011. 
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visas to low-skilled migrants, so domestic workers – typically viewed as low-skilled 
workers – did not fit.29 Under the new regime, when migrant domestic workers arrive 
lawfully in the country accompanying an employer, their visa status ties them to this 
employer.30 Their residency status is lawful only for as long as the employer with 
whom they entered employs them, to a maximum of six months. The six-month 
period is not renewable. Like ODW workers since 2012 and before 1998, diplomatic 
domestic workers are also tied to their employer. They do not have the six-month 
restriction of those with an ODW visa, but are likewise very vulnerable, not only for 
the reasons that affect all tied migrant domestic workers but also because of the 
diplomatic status and immunity enjoyed by their employers. 31  For diplomatic 
domestic workers, there is no requirement that the employment relationship pre-exists 
entry to the country.  
 
When the 2012 regime was introduced, the Government acknowledged that ‘the 
[overseas domestic worker] routes can at times result in the import of abusive 
employer/employee relationships to the UK’.32 The following safeguards were said to 
protect against this: that the employment relationship is in existence for at least 12 
months before arrival; that there is strong evidence for the existence of the 
relationship; that written terms and conditions are agreed between the employer and 
the worker before entry in the UK; that information is given to the workers by UK 
authorities, before they arrive, on their rights and avenues for help while they are in 
the country.33 These policies were in place before 2012, and had been previously 
criticized.34 
 
Between 15,000 and 16,000 ODW visas are issued each year, according to statistics 
provided by the Home Office, and about 250 diplomatic domestic worker visas. The 
Home Office does not provide any further information on the arrivals but produces 
data on the nationality of the employers. About 80% of the employers under the ODW 
visa come from a very small number of countries in the Middle East: 4,894 from the 
United Arab Emirates; 3,996 from Saudi Arabia; 2,581 from Qatar; 1,005 from 
Kuwait; and 257 from Oman.35 
 
                                                        
29 B. Anderson, Us and Them (2013) 175. See further discussion of the system in M. Ruhs, The Price 
of Rights – Regulating International Labor Migration (2013) 92. 
30  See Immigration Rules, 159A-159H, available at 
<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/part5/>. 
31 C. Murphy, ‘Researching Barriers to Access to Justice for Migrant Domestic Workers in Diplomatic 
Households’ (2013) 42 Industrial Law J. 447-453. See also Reyes & Anor v. Al-Malki & Anor [2015] 
EWCA Civ 32. 
32 Statement by Home Secretary Theresa May, Written Ministerial Statements, 29 February 2012, Col. 
35WS. 
33 Home Office, Statement of Intent: Changes to Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 5 of the Points Based System; 
Overseas Domestic Workers; and Visitors, February 2012, available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117953/tiers125-pbs-
overseas-soi.pdf> 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/299022/ODW_v10.0E
XT.pdf>  
34 See, for instance, N. Clarke and L. Kumarappan, ‘Turning a Blind Eye: The British State and 
Migrant Domestic Workers’ Employment Rights’, Working Lives Research Institute, August 2011; K. 
Roberts, ‘Non Priority Slaves?’, Migrants Rights Network, 20 December 2013. 
35 Lord Bates, 25 February 2015, Hansard Col. 1701. 
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The domestic workers’ visa is not the only example of a visa that ties a worker to a 
particular employer. Sometimes high-skilled workers are tied to an employer. 36 
However, the fact that domestic work is a disadvantaged sector, excluded from much 
labour protective legislation, compounded by restrictive visa regimes, means that it is 
not comparable to other sectors. The interconnection between the sectoral problems 
and the extremely tight immigration rules creates unprecedented challenges.37 At the 
same time the UK ODW and diplomatic visas are more restrictive than similar 
regimes affecting domestic workers in other legal orders, such as Canada.38 
 
In this context, Kalayaan, the main UK-based NGO specialising in the labour rights of 
migrant domestic workers, published statistics on the immigration rules in April 
2014.39 These showed that workers registered with the NGO who entered the UK on 
the new visa reported significantly worse treatment than those that were not tied to 
their employer during the same period of time but under the previous regime. More 
precisely, they found that migrant domestic workers with a visa that ties them to their 
employers were twice as likely to report having being physically abused to those who 
were not so tied (16% and 8%); that almost three quarters of workers that were tied to 
the employer were not allowed to leave the house unsupervised, which is again a 
significantly larger number than workers under a non-tied visa; that 65% of the 
domestic workers did not have their own rooms; that the majority work more than 16 
hours a day, and a greater number of them than previously were assessed as more 
susceptible to human trafficking. A further concern was that the number of people 
registered with Kalayaan dropped by a third, while the number of visas issued 
remained consistent. In 2015 the organization’s new statistics confirmed that the 
abuse reported by workers under the tied visa are proportionately consistently higher 
than the abuse reported by other workers. The immediate effects of the visa were also 
explored in a study by Human Rights Watch, ‘Hidden Away’,40 which reported labour 
exploitation and other types of abuse, such as physical or psychological abuse. 
Following a mission to the UK, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women further highlighted the problems of the visa for domestic workers. 41  In 
relation to diplomatic domestic workers in particular, research suggests that it was 
always clear that the incidence of exploitation and abuse affecting them was higher.42  
 
 
 
                                                        
36 See the discussion in J. Carens, ‘Live-In Domestics, Seasonal Workers, and Others Hard to Locate 
on the Map of Democracy’ (2008) 16 J. of Political Philosophy 419-445. 
37 E. Albin, ‘The Sectoral Regulatory Regime: Where Work Migration Controls and the Sectorally 
Differentiated Labour Market Meet’, in Migrants at Work, eds. C. Costello and M. Freedland (2014). 
38 See the discussion in J. Fudge, ‘Precarious Migrant Status and Precarious Employment: The Paradox 
of International Rights for Migrant Workers’ (2012) 34 Comparative Labor Law and Policy J. 95-132, 
106 ff. 
39  Kalayaan, ‘Slavery by Another Name: The Tied Migrant Domestic Worker Visa’, available at 
<http://kalayaan.org.uk/documents/Slavery%20by%20a%20new%20name-
%20Briefing%207.5.13.pdf>. 
40 Human Rights Watch, ‘Hidden Away’, March 2014. See also Centre for Social Justice Report, ‘It 
Happens Here’, March 2013; A. Boff, ‘Shadow City, Exposing Human Trafficking in Everyday 
London’, GLA Conservatives, October 2013; F. Field MP, ‘Report of the Modern Slavery Evidence 
Review’, December 2013. 
41  UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 15 April 2014, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14514&LangID=E>. 
42 Lalani, op. cit., n. 25, chapter 4. 
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EXPERIENCES OF MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN THE UK 
 
Against this background, for the purposes of the present study, I conducted interviews 
with 24 migrant domestic workers that arrived in the UK on a visa that ties them to 
the employer (ODW and diplomatic domestic workers). 43  For reasons that were 
developed earlier in this article, the nature of the job means that there are obvious 
barriers in accessing ODW and diplomatic domestic workers. I approached the 
interviewees through Kalayaan, which used its database of registered workers and 
arranged the interviews using its relation of trust with these workers. Domestic 
workers approach Kalayaan to learn about their labour rights, to get support, to build 
a social network, to attend English classes and for other such reasons. I was 
introduced to them as a trustee of Kalayaan, and conducted the interviews in the 
offices of the organisation with the help of interpreters, when needed.  
 
The purpose of the study was not to find a representative sample or to produce 
quantitative analysis of the numbers of workers under this visa regime, which would 
not be possible in the case of this group. Workers that approach Kalayaan may not be 
a representative sample in that they may be more empowered, confident, 
knowledgeable or abused than other domestic workers. However, this organization is 
the only one that has evidence involving a workforce that is hidden and on which we 
have no other data available.  
 
All the workers that participated in the study were women, and almost all of them 
were already migrant workers before coming to the UK. Originally, they came from 
countries in Southeast Asia (such as the Philippines or Indonesia), South Asia (India) 
or North Africa, and they migrated to work for employers in the Middle East or North 
Africa, and they arrived in the UK from these countries. 44  The ages of the 
interviewees ranged between 18 and 65 years old. Their educational background was 
very diverse: from those who had attended only primary school to university 
graduates. Almost all domestic workers interviewed said that they had dependents in 
their country of origin and migrated in the first place in order to support those 
dependents. Even though I did not aim to interview only domestic workers that had 
already escaped their employers, almost all interviewees had left their employers. 
This was inevitable because often workers have left abusive employers by the time 
that they approach Kalayaan.  
 
The interviews of this study were conducted as a step in exploring the experiences, 
views and understanding of the visa regime of a group of marginalised individuals 
who are usually very difficult for researchers to reach. The purpose of this empirical 
exploration was to attempt to identify some common themes in their experiences in 
relation to their living and working conditions before and after arrival, and to 
understand what may be some of the long-term effects of the visa on those that have 
escaped their employers. This section presents some findings of the interviews 
                                                        
43  Prior to conducting the interviews, ethical approval was granted by UCL’s Research Ethics 
Committee (Project ID 5949/001). All the names of the interviewees have been changed in order to 
protect their anonymity. The interviewees were offered a £20 super-market voucher in appreciation of 
their time. Their travel expenses were also covered. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
unless the interviewee preferred not to be recorded in which case I kept notes only. 
44 No further information on the nationality of the interviewees will be provided, in order to protect 
their anonymity. 
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organised according to themes: it explores domestic workers’ experience of the living 
and working conditions before and after arrival, as well as their fears and hopes.45 
 
 
1. Work and life before and upon arrival  
 
Almost all interviewees arrived from Gulf countries. The dramatic state of the rights 
of migrant workers in the Middle East is well documented.46 A 2014 Report on Qatar, 
where some of the interviewees came from, suggested that these workers are in a legal 
vacuum and are seriously abused.47 One of the gravest problems faced by migrant 
workers there is the use of the kafala (sponsorship) system that links a migrant worker 
to a single employer. 48  There are different variations of kafala in different Gulf 
countries. In Qatar, for example, the kafala system means that the worker is linked to 
the sponsoring employer, and cannot work for anyone else or indeed leave the 
country, unless the employer agrees to it. This has been heavily criticized by labour 
and human rights organisations.49 The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of Migrants said that ‘[t]he kafala system enables unscrupulous employers to exploit 
employees. Frequent cases of abuse against migrants include the confiscation of 
passports, refusal to give “no objection” certificates (allowing migrants to change 
employer) or exit permits and refusal to pay migrants’ plane tickets to return home’.50 
In 2010, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the Gulf states ‘to 
replace the kafala system with updated labour laws that can better balance rights and 
duties’.51 In light of this situation of dependency of the worker on the employer, it 
was no surprise that the interviewees in the present study reported that the employers 
held their passports both before and after arrival in the UK. 
 
The interviewees, live-in domestic workers, said that their tasks covered every aspect 
of housework: caring for children or elderly people, cleaning, shopping, cooking and 
serving. Their salaries were reported to be as low as £50 per month, and to generally 
range between £100-250 per month. Interviewees reported working between 12 and 
20 hours a day, depending on the needs of the children of the families or depending 
on when the employers needed them more generally. Almost all the workers 
interviewed said that they were not allowed out of the house unaccompanied. They 
also explained that they worked every day of the week, with no day off. By way of an 
example, one domestic worker who had one day off per month said that she was 
                                                        
45 Themes of potential relevance were identified through two pilot interviews. 
46 On the working conditions in Qatar, for instance, see the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants, 23 April 2014, <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/A-
HRC-26-35-Add1_en.pdf> On Saudi Arabia, see Al-Jazeera, ‘The Plight of Migrant Workers in Saudi 
Arabia’, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2013/01/201311116530348352.html> 
and Human Rights Watch, ‘As If I Am not Human’, July 2008. On the United Arab Emirates, see 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Domestic Workers Trapped, Exploited and Abused in the UAE’ 
<http://mm.hrw.org/content/domestic-workers-trapped-exploited-and-abused-uae>. 
47 Report on Qatar, id., paras. 48-50. 
48 For further details, see M. Ruhs, The Price of Rights – Regulating International Labor Migration 
(2013) 97. 
49 A. Khan, ‘Why it’s Time to End Kafala’, The Guardian, 26 February 2014; The Economist, ‘The 
Middle East’s Migrant Workers: Forget About Rights’, 10 August 2013.  
50 Op. cit., n. 66, para. 25. 
51 ‘Human Rights and the Gulf Region’, Address by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 19 
April 2010, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/ch/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9997&LangID=E>  
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refused a second day off in one month, when she requested this after nine years 
employed by the same employer.52 She also said that she was refused a rise of her 
£200 monthly salary. Another worker responded to the question whether she had any 
time off: ‘Yes, [my employer] gave me time off to help her relatives’.53 When I 
explained to her that time off means time away from work, she said that she only had 
about six hours off every month. A worker who asked for some time off said: ‘I told 
[the employers]: “Please let me rest. I will be sick.” And they said: “No. Who are 
you? A Madam?”’. She later added: ‘[My employer] never let me sit on the chair, she 
got me to sit on the floor’.54  
 
As these workers are live-in domestic workers, their home is in the employers’ 
household, which is also their own workplace. This sets obvious obstacles to 
calculating their working time and protecting their privacy. Some of the interviewees 
said that they had their own room, but others said that they had to share a room with 
the children of the family. One interviewee said that she was staying in the storage 
room in the employers’ house. Many interviewees said that they did not eat at the 
same time as the employers and that nutrition was not always sufficient. One 
interviewee said: ‘I had dinner/meals in the kitchen. I was not allowed to join them. 
After they finished eating, they allowed me to eat. I cried every day’. 55 Another 
interviewee said:  
 
I was very skinny because I didn’t have food… [I was] very hungry. 
When they ate, they treated me like an animal. They sat at the table but 
I stayed on the other side. They gave me food just like you give food to 
animals.56 
 
Interviewees reported psychological and physical abuse. Some workers recounted that 
the employers shouted at them and some also reported violent behaviour, such as 
slapping. One interviewee said: ‘If I did something wrong with my work or if the 
baby kept crying and I could not handle it, they hit me’.57 Others explained that they 
did not react to the employers’ ill-treatment because they knew that they might be 
physically abused if they did. Some interviewees reported being sexually harassed or 
assaulted by their employers; one worker said that she was sexually harassed by other 
domestic workers, but that the employers took no action to protect the worker, even 
though the harassment had been brought to their attention. One of the interviewees 
said that she had attempted to commit suicide because of the harassment that she 
suffered.  
 
Despite the ill-treatment that they reported in their interviews, the interviewees said 
that they felt that they could not escape while they were there. One interviewee 
explained that she was not locked in, but she still felt unable to escape:  
 
They just didn’t let me go out. I was also afraid to go out on my own in 
Qatar because all their relatives lived in the area. If I wanted to go out, I 
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only went with my employer when she wanted to go to the market. I 
never went on my own.58 
 
 When asked why she did not escape from her employers, another interviewee said 
‘[t]hat’s why I did not run away there; because there are no human rights in Qatar’.59 
One interviewee explained to me that she went to the agency that assigned her to the 
family for which she worked to tell them that she was being ill-treated by her 
employer. However, the agency did nothing about it, because her employers were 
‘important […], they had all the power’ and the agency ‘knew these people and were 
afraid of them’.60 
 
Another worker that arrived from Saudi Arabia responded to the same question as 
follows: 
 
Everything is in control of the employer. I am telling you, there are no 
human rights in that country. Even if you pay them back for your visa 
and how much they spent for you and say “I want to go back now”, you 
will die.61 
 
Regarding the safeguards that are supposed to be in place through the ODW visa in 
order to prevent the exploitation of these workers and to provide them with 
information and support in the UK, such as an employment contract and information 
on labour rights at the Embassy or at the airport, the interviewees reported that these 
were either not implemented in practice or were ineffective. The workers interviewed 
said that the employers hold their passports and, in the majority of the interviews, the 
workers said that they were not given information at the UK Embassy in the country 
from which they arrived.  
 
Very few interviewees said that they saw and signed a contract. Moreover, those that 
did explained that they did not understand it or that the terms of their work did not 
comply with it in reality. One interviewee said, for example: ‘Yes, I saw a paper. But 
I don’t know how to read. So, they gave me a paper and said “sign here”’.62 The 
workers interviewed said that they were not given information at the airport, upon 
arrival. They explained that they arrived with their employer, which on their view is 
the reason that they were not given this information at the airport. From the 
interviews, it emerged that they felt that the employer was ‘in charge’ of the situation 
at the Embassy and the airport. 
 
The interviewees said that they did not know about the details of their visa prior to 
arrival in the UK. Only a few of them said that they had been informed that the visa 
would not be renewable or that they would not be permitted to change employers. 
They also said that they had extremely vague knowledge about UK labour rights, such 
as a minimum wage or maximum working time. 
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The experience reported by the interviewees that the safeguards that are supposed to 
exist are not implemented in practice also supports the conclusions of the Centre for 
Social Justice Report, ‘It Happens Here’, which suggested that the information letter 
is not issued in many cases and contains no information on possible grave abuse of 
labour rights. It also says very little about workers’ rights in the UK and has no 
further guidance on where information can be found.63 The Centre for Social Justice 
used by way of an example the statement that the letter refers to the ‘ACAS helpline’, 
without explaining what ACAS stands for or what it can offer.64  
 
For reasons explained below, even if these safeguards were in place, however, they 
would not provide sufficient protection to domestic workers. 
 
2. Work and life after arrival 
 
Some of the interviewees explained that they did not want to come to the UK, but that 
the employers required them to do so. One of the workers said:  
 
I did not want to come here. Because her son [for whom they wanted me to 
work in the UK] is too… I don’t like him… his attitude. They forced me to 
come here.65  
 
In this particular example, the interviewee suggested that the employers abused the 
domestic worker visa regime in order to transfer the worker to another employer (their 
son in this case). Similarly, another worker said that the employer brought her to work 
for his sister who was ill and needed a carer. This was contrary to the worker’s own 
wishes, as she said, but she reported that she was required to do it because that 
woman’s domestic worker could not accompany her for the reason that she had not 
been working for her for one year (as the ODW visa requires). A worker who was 
brought in the country to work for the employers’ daughter while she was a student, 
reported that she asked the employer to renew her visa when it expired, but that the 
employer refused her request. This worker did not know that her visa was not 
renewable. 
 
After arrival in the UK, the interviewees reported that their working conditions did 
not improve. To the contrary, some interviewees said that their living and working 
conditions deteriorated. Sometimes they said that they stayed in less spacious 
accommodation (in hotel rooms that they shared with the employers) than in the 
country from where they arrived. One of the interviewees recounted that in the UK 
she slept on the bathroom floor because of a lack of space, which made the 
employment relationship more tense than it was before coming to the UK.66  She 
explained that because she slept there, she could hardly get any rest.  
 
Interviewees said that no pay increases took place while in the UK, even if the 
employers had agreed with the workers or the authorities prior to arrival that they 
                                                        
63 Centre for Social Justice, op.cit., n. 25, 94.  
64  The letter in question is available here: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/265823/dworkers-
informationsheet.pdf>.  
65 Amanda. 
66 Evelyn. 
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would pay the worker a higher salary. In fact, some of those interviewed said that they 
were not paid at all while in the UK. One of the workers, for example, explained that 
the employers stopped sending her salary to her family in the Philippines during the 
four months that she worked for them in London. Another worker said that she asked 
her employer to pay her salary in accordance with her contract, but that the employer 
responded: ‘That is only in the papers’.67 
 
The workers interviewed said that their hours of work remained extremely high in the 
UK and that they were still not allowed to go out unaccompanied. One interviewee 
explained that, when she was in the UK, the employers locked her up in the flat, 
which is something that did not happen before arrival, perhaps because, as she 
suggested, there was nowhere to go. 
 
One of the disturbing findings during the interviews was that these domestic workers 
are used to, and do not object to, extremely low living standards and the absence of 
labour rights in the country from which they arrive. They have already worked for 
long periods in countries with no labour protection and with serious exploitation of 
migrant workers. From the interviews, it emerged that they take the abuse for granted.  
 
(a) Dependency, fear and intimidation  
 
According to the interviewees, while in the UK, the employers still kept the workers’ 
passports and sometimes threatened them that, if they escaped, the police would 
arrest, imprison and deport them. One of the workers interviewed also said that she 
received death threats from her employer.  
 
One night … [the employer] was very angry with me because he wanted 
food but at that time the market was closed so I came back home and told 
him ‘sorry, it is closed’. If you want tomorrow you can eat. It’s late. And he 
said ‘what are you saying? I’m giving you your salary and what are you 
telling me that it is late and the market is closed?’ ‘There is no market open 
by now; it’s too late’. And he threw me some things and told me: ‘I can kill 
you and throw you into the sea. It is an ocean there’. And I was scared. It 
was the two of us in his flat. I was scared about what would happen to me. 
What would I really do? I didn’t know.68 
 
Even workers who said that they had been abused, still showed elements of loyalty to 
their employers:  
 
I ran away. I left them sleeping. I didn’t want to make it risky for the child 
by leaving it behind in a hotel. So in the middle of the night, when they 
were sleeping, I packed my things and ran away without any documents, 
without any pocket money. I just had my stuff and myself that cold night.69  
 
A worker who reported sexual abuse by her male employer said:  
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I needed the money and the work and […] my Madam treated me nice. 
Also, I could not leave my Madam because of her illness, even though my 
male employer was treating me like that.70 
 
The interviewees appeared to be extremely fearful when discussing their employment 
experience. They expressed fear of abusive employers, fear of the authorities and fear 
of acting in any way that may be considered illegal. Some interviewees also expressed 
the belief that the employers remain unaccountable because they are very powerful or 
because there is no legal route to hold them to account, as they have been informed 
when they are in the UK. 
 
Despite the abuse and exploitation reported by the interviewees, most of them said 
that they have not been or would not go to the police or immigration authorities. Even 
though they said that they miss their loved ones who are in their country of origin, 
they explained that they fear deportation because of their economic need which led 
them to migrate in the first place.  
 
 
(b) Escape and being undocumented  
 
Almost all the domestic workers interviewed are now undocumented for periods 
ranging from a few months to two years because they escaped their employers. The 
workers that ran away said that the escape was not part of a plan. It was a sudden 
decision:  
 
I decided to leave them suddenly because I couldn’t handle living with 
them any more … I left without anywhere to go and then I met someone 
outside. I did not go to the police, because I did not know how to go to 
the police.71  
 
The interviewees said that they still did not have their passports when they escaped. 
One of the workers recounted that she asked her former employer to return her 
passport to her, and the employer said that she had to pay £2,000 in order to have it. 
Another worker said: 
 
[W]hen I left the hotel of my employer, my mother told me: ‘if they 
don’t give you the passport, why don’t you call the police?’. Because 
they [the employers] did not tell me anything about it. I didn’t know 
what to do. I only knew that they took my passport for some reason, eg. 
maybe they thought that I would not be going back to them. I don’t 
know. Because if the police asked me while I was going there about my 
passport, they would put me in jail – if I didn’t have a passport. I didn’t 
know the situation. They didn’t tell me. I thought it was ok not to take 
my passport from my employer.72 
 
The majority of the interviewees said that they only learned after they escaped that 
they had no right to remain in the country or work for a new employer. Some 
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interviewees said that they believed that they would have more rights in the UK. One 
said, for example: ‘In Saudi Arabia I could not leave them. Here I could go anywhere 
and disappear because it is a country with more freedom’.73  
 
The workers interviewed said that they know that they are now undocumented and 
seemed embarrassed by their status. They said that they are driven underground: they 
explained that they do not want to return to their employers because of the abuse and 
exploitation that they suffered. Most of the interviewees said that they do not have a 
case pending in court against the former employers. They also said that they do not 
want to return to their country of origin either, because they have dependents to 
support who are in desperate economic need. They spoke about their needy children, 
spouses or parents in their country of origin. One interviewee who reported serious 
exploitation while in the UK said: 
 
I am afraid that if I don’t get a visa and have to go back to my country, 
the owner of the house [where my mother lives] will kick her out. And 
it is really difficult to find a job in Indonesia.  […] Once I was two 
weeks late to pay my mom’s rent and they kicked her out […] I think 
about my mom being alone there without family… Other members of 
our family have passed away. We don’t have any family. My brother 
was sick and my mom didn’t tell me. She borrowed money from the 
neighbors. That’s why I was working here. I just finished paying the 
money back for when my brother was in the hospital. I just finished 
paying this and then I lost my job.74 
 
After becoming undocumented in the UK, many of these workers said that they find 
part-time jobs for a few hours a week. They explained that the new employers 
sometimes know about their illegality and are reluctant to hire them full-time as live-
in domestic workers, so very few have full-time jobs. Some said that they found full-
time work initially but were subsequently dismissed because of their legal status. 
Most of the interviewees therefore said that they have a couple of jobs every week, 
with different employers for 3-4 hours a week. Some said that they live with friends 
and share living costs with them, and a few also said that they work as domestic 
workers for the people with whom they share accommodation. They explained that 
any income that they send to their families covers basic material needs like electricity, 
nutrition and education. The interviewees said that they have to work in order to 
support their dependents, and most said that they would like to have full-time jobs as 
live-in domestic workers but that they cannot find such jobs because they are 
undocumented.  
 
The workers interviewed said that their hourly or weekly pay is sometimes in 
accordance with the law and even above the minimum wage (about £10 per hour), but 
that sometimes the new employers, knowing of their status as undocumented 
migrants, exploit them further by paying them below the minimum wage (£5-6 per 
hour or less),75 getting them to work very long hours or dismissing them without 
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reason and with no compensation. Some of the workers said explicitly that they know 
that they are being exploited. One interviewee said, for example:  
 
Sometimes if you have an interview and you tell [the prospective 
employers] that you don’t have papers, they take advantage of you and 
they give you a small salary.76  
 
Despite this, the interviewees said that they would not consider going to the 
authorities because they are afraid of deportation. Some of the interviewees told me 
that they were afraid to use the £20 super-market voucher that I offered to them after 
the interview in appreciation of their time, because they feared that this might lead to 
their arrest, detention and deportation. They are ‘deportable’ and hence easily 
‘disposable’ by their employers.  
 
Most of the workers interviewed say that they are isolated in the UK. They may now 
know some people, often another migrant domestic worker from their country of 
origin, but their opportunities to be part of groups or networks of support are very 
limited. Above all, they explained that it is their fear that makes them prefer this 
isolation. This became particularly evident when I asked them if they are or if they 
would consider becoming members of a trade union, which for domestic workers can 
serve as a forum for social interaction.77 Most interviewees said that they were not 
aware of the existence or meaning of trade unionism, but when I explained it to them, 
some explicitly said that they would be scared to join any organization other than a 
small number of NGOs (mainly Kalayaan) that they have come to trust.  
 
Some of those interviewed further suggested that they know other domestic workers 
that are now undocumented, but who are not registered with Kalayaan. One worker 
said for example: 
 
There are so many [undocumented domestic workers in my situation] 
here but they do not want to go out because they are scared. Last week I 
brought one in the group. She has been here almost two years but she 
does not have a passport and she did not register with Kalayaan. 
Everyone around her told her not to speak to anyone, that the police 
could catch you etc.78 
 
The isolation of these workers is not only from the broader society but also isolation 
from their loved ones. Some interviewees explained that their undocumented status 
means that they cannot travel back to their country of origin because, if they do, they 
will not be allowed to return to the UK. A situation that is probably inconceivable for 
most people is just another fact of life for these undocumented workers.  
 
In light of this empirical study, the longer-term implications of the visas that tie 
domestic workers to the employer, therefore, appear to involve the creation of a 
workforce that lives undocumented, underground, invisible and fearful, even more 
prone to exploitation than other domestic workers, or arguably, due to the fact that 
                                                        
76 Ella. 
77 Albin and Mantouvalou, op. cit., n. 12. 
78 Marie. 
 18 
they are employed in private households away from the public eye, more prone to 
exploitation than the labour force as a whole. 
 
 
VISA OF ENSLAVEMENT  
 
The interviewees reported living hidden lives: hidden from the authorities and very 
often also hidden from other networks of support, such as civil society organisations. 
They experience a situation of greater legislative precariousness than other domestic 
workers, situated in the shadows of the law.79 It has been argued that in cases of 
exploitation of migrant workers, it is the individual employer or trafficker that is 
viewed as evil, but in fact ‘[t]he state is responsible for the maintenance of a legal 
framework within which certain occupations and sectors are deregulated, and exist 
outside labour protection rules; and it is complicit in permitting third parties to profit 
from migrants’ labour…’.80 Through human rights law, state obligations can become 
central because this body of law was primarily developed to protect individuals from 
state action. Most human rights documents incorporate state obligations to respect and 
secure individual rights.81  The obligations of state authorities would come to the 
forefront in the present context if the overseas domestic worker visas were classified 
as visas that may lead to slavery and servitude.82 If there is a link between the visas 
explored here, on the one hand, and conditions of slavery, on the other, the state that 
enacted this visa regime may be responsible for a violation of the workers’ human 
rights. The subsections that follow examine the definition of slavery and servitude 
under the ECHR and then turn to the more concrete state obligations under human 
rights law. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides that the terms ‘slavery’ and 
‘servitude’ must be construed in accordance with article 4 of the ECHR.83 
 
1. Slavery and Servitude 
 
On the traditional legal definition of classical slavery, its key feature is that 
individuals are treated as property. The 1926 UN Slavery Convention provides the 
following definition: ‘Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’.84 Referring to this 
Convention, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Siliadin v. France,85 
which involved a migrant domestic worker, explained that her situation could not be 
classified as slavery because there was no legal right of ownership over her in French 
law, but that it constituted ‘servitude’, which also fell within the scope of article 4 of 
the ECHR that prohibits slavery, servitude, forced and compulsory labour. The Court 
defined ‘servitude’ as ‘an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the 
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use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of “slavery”’.86 Factors that 
contributed to this classification included the living and working conditions of the 
applicant, her fear that was nurtured by her employers, the fact that her passport had 
been confiscated and that she was not allowed to leave the household. The legal 
implication of this classification as a result of Siliadin was that France had a positive 
obligation under the ECHR to criminalise this type of exploitative relations.  
 
The Siliadin judgment did not examine a visa regime but explored a situation of 
exploitation of an undocumented minor. But legal challenges to visa regimes that 
were associated with situations of slavery have arisen in courts. A regime very similar 
to the ODW visa that tied workers to one employer in Israel was found by the Israeli 
Constitutional Court to violate human dignity and to breach the Constitution by 
creating a situation that was described as foreign to labour law principles and to the 
contract of employment.87 One of the Court’s judges said that the visa constitutes a 
modern form of slavery.88  
 
In Europe, in a case on sex trafficking in breach of article 4 of the ECHR, the ECtHR 
ruled that a very restrictive visa regime – the artiste visa regime in Cyprus – led to a 
violation of the Convention. 89  This was because it did not afford ‘practical and 
effective protection against trafficking and exploitation’.90 Rantsev involved a young 
woman from Russia who was trafficked to Cyprus under an ‘artiste visa’. An ‘artiste’ 
was defined in the legislation as ‘any alien who wishes to enter Cyprus in order to 
work in a cabaret, musical-dancing place or other night entertainment place and has 
attained the age of 18 years’.91 Under this scheme, Ms Rantseva received a temporary 
work and residence permit. Having worked at a cabaret for three days, she escaped, 
only to be captured soon after and taken to the police. Since her immigration status 
was not irregular, the police returned her to her employer. Later that night she was 
found dead on the street below the flat where she was staying. An application was 
submitted to the ECtHR by Ms Rantseva’s father, who claimed that Russia and 
Cyprus had breached Article 4 of the Convention (among other provisions). The 
judgment of the Court did not distinguish between slavery and servitude, but said that 
human trafficking is covered by article 4. 
 
With respect to the immigration rules, in Rantsev of particular concern was the fact 
that cabaret managers made an application for an entry permit for the artiste in a way 
that rendered the migrant dependent on the employer or agent. This artiste visa 
scheme made individuals vulnerable to traffickers.92 In addition, the Court found that 
the obligation of the employers to inform the authorities if an artiste leaves her 
employment is a legitimate means to the end of monitoring compliance with 
immigration law. However, it is only the authorities that should take steps in the event 
of non-compliance. Monitoring compliance cannot be the duty of the manager. This is 
why the Court was particularly troubled by the practice of asking cabaret owners and 
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managers to lodge a bank guarantee to be used to cover artistes they employed. 
Rantsev shows, then, that a visa regime, which is very restrictive and creates strong 
ties between the worker and the employer, creating the opportunity to exercise control 
over her, may breach the Convention. It can be said that the Cypriot visa regime that 
was found to violate the Convention in Rantsev was more restrictive than the ODW 
visa. However, the Rantsev principles can be extended to cover this visa too. Indeed 
domestic workers may be viewed as more vulnerable than those under the artiste visa, 
for reasons such as their invisibility and isolation.  
 
In a manner similar to the Cypriot artiste visa, the ODW and diplomatic visas do not 
create a legal right of ownership of the employers over the workers. However, many 
of the domestic workers that were interviewed reported having been treated like 
objects and having faced serious coercion. One of the interviewees who did not know 
that her visa was not renewable and asked her employer to have it renewed was told:  
 
Who are you? You are just a worker. Don’t complain about the visa, 
otherwise I’ll send you back to Indonesia and you will never come to 
London or Dubai again.93  
 
The domestic workers interviewed used words that conveyed that they felt objectified. 
They often said that the employers ‘brought them’ to the country, sometimes against 
their will, and did not let them leave the household unaccompanied. One of the 
workers explained that she had previously worked for other employers who had 
‘transferred’ her to the employer with whom she entered the UK. At the airport, upon 
arrival, the workers suggested that they felt that the employer was in charge of the 
situation. This sense of objectification may be reinforced by the fact that the visa on 
the workers’ passport mentions the name of the employer. The workers themselves 
seem to have accepted their objectification, having realized that they have no 
reasonable alternative exactly because of their great economic need.  
 
It may be suggested that these workers do not really face conditions of slavery 
because they still have an option to return to their home country. However, this was 
not a real alternative for the interviewees, who all explained that their dependents in 
their country of origin are in great economic need.94 It is therefore very questionable 
whether they can be viewed as free, because this would reflect a very poor 
understanding of freedom.95 This empirical exploration indicates that the system that 
ties the workers to the employer creates a unique power of control, with the only 
alternative for the worker being escape that leads to illegality. With the power that the 
law gives to the employer to treat workers as property, it should not come as a 
surprise that the Joint Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill said: ‘Tying 
domestic workers to their employer institutionalizes their abuse; it is slavery and is 
therefore incongruous with our aim to act decisively to protect the victims of modern 
slavery’.96  
 
2. State obligations 
 
                                                        
93 Victoria. 
94 See for instance, the statement of Pennie, text accompanying n. 74. 
95 See generally, J. Waldron, ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’, in Liberal Rights (1993). 
96 Report of the Joint Committee on Draft Modern Slavery Bill, op. cit., n. 2. 
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The UK immigration regime imports, tolerates and facilitates situations that are 
uncomfortably close to slavery, and this may give raise to a violation of both positive 
and negative state obligations under the ECHR.97 Positive obligations under article 4 
were first discussed in Siliadin98 and further developed in Rantsev. These may, for 
example, arise when state authorities are ‘aware, or ought to have been aware, of 
circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that an identified individual had 
been, or was at real and immediate risk of being, trafficked or exploited […]. In the 
case of an answer in the affirmative, there will be a violation of Article 4 of the 
Convention where the authorities fail to take appropriate measures within the scope of 
their powers to remove the individual from that situation or risk’.99 Together with the 
despair of undocumented workers who arrived in the country under the ODW or 
diplomatic visa that was evident in the interviews that I conducted, the evidence of 
exploitation and abuse is growing. The reality that some of the interviewees have 
been recognized as victims of human trafficking reinforces the belief that these visas 
can raise issues under the Convention. The Government cannot claim that it was not 
aware of the ill-treatment suffered by many overseas domestic workers. That it does 
not put in place effective legislation and safeguards to protect them from this abuse 
may thus lead to a breach of its positive obligations under article 4, such as the duty to 
take positive operational measures in order to protect individuals.  
 
In addition, the restrictions of the visa regime itself can give rise to a violation of the 
negative obligations under the Convention. Here I will focus on state obligations to 
refrain from action that puts individuals at risk of a violation of human rights. Such a 
violation would occur, for instance, if a state that imprisons individuals (positive 
action) does not take further action to ensure that prison conditions are decent and that 
prisoners are not at risk of abuse. In the case of the visa, the violation of negative 
obligations arises because the visa restrictions lead workers to be undocumented, and 
hence further prone to exploitation, exactly because of their undocumented status. 
Many of the workers interviewed reported being exploited by employers after they 
became undocumented and said that it is their undocumented status that made them 
more vulnerable to exploitation. Moreover, there is little that they can do to hold the 
new employers to account, not only because they are very fearful, as emerged from 
this study, but also because of other aspects of the law. Any employment relationship 
in which the interviewees enter after they escape is based on an illegal contract, which 
cannot be enforced, for the reason that they are undocumented and do not have a right 
to work. The legal implications of an illegal employment contract were examined in 
the 2014 UK Supreme Court decision Allen v. Hounga.100 An undocumented migrant 
domestic worker, Ms Hounga, who had been exploited, abused and dismissed, was 
unsuccessful in her contractual claims, such as for unfair dismissal, unpaid wages and 
holiday pay, but was successful in her race discrimination claims because, the Court 
held, she was probably a victim of human trafficking when she was a minor. Some of 
the interviewees in the present study said that the authorities have recognized them as 
                                                        
97  On positive obligations, see D. Spielmann, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, the 
European Court of Human Rights’, in Human Rights and the Private Sphere, eds. D. Oliver and J. 
Fedtke (2007). 
98 See H. Cullen, ‘Siliadin v France: Positive Obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Rev. 585. 
99 Rantsev, para. 286. 
100 See Hounga v. Allen and Another [2014] UKSC 47 on appeal from [2012] EWCA Civ 609. For 
analysis, see A. Bogg and S. Green, ‘Rights Are Not Just for the Virtuous: What Hounga Means for the 
Illegality Defence in the Discrimination Torts’ (2015) 44 Industrial Law J. 101. 
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victims of trafficking, so they might enjoy limited legal protection if they bring a tort 
claim, on the basis of Hounga; but not all of them are recognized as victims of 
trafficking. At the same time, being a victim of trafficking does not mean that the 
individual will not be deported. 101  With the narrow exception that was recently 
developed in Hounga, the law leaves the rest of these undocumented workers 
powerless, trapped in ongoing cycles of exploitation.  
 
Against this background, and given the willingness of both the ECtHR and the UK 
Supreme Court to address some of the problems faced by migrant domestic workers 
in recent years,102 there is good reason to believe that some courts may be open to 
examining human rights challenges against the overseas domestic workers visas. 
 
Some literature has raised concerns about associating the overseas domestic workers 
visas (or more broadly other labour rights issues) with human rights and slavery.103 
One line of criticism suggests that linking the visa to slavery and its prohibition by 
human rights law will require criminalization of the employer, while paying 
insufficient attention to the protection of workers’ rights. This concern is important. It 
is problematic to focus only on the most extreme situations of abuse, those of slavery 
and servitude, and to disregard the labour rights of domestic workers more generally 
(such as in relation to the minimum wage or health and safety). However, the urgency 
of the current problem of the visa and the degree of ill-treatment explains why it is 
viewed as an issue of priority by proponents of workers’ rights. In addition, the 
problems of slavery and servitude, on the one hand, and other labour rights violations, 
on the other, are not disconnected.104 The normative challenges may be qualitatively 
different and separate but they should all be addressed, and the approaches can 
complement each other. It is true that the ECtHR ruled that lack of criminalization of 
a situation of ‘servitude’ in Siliadin violated article 4 of the Convention. Yet there is 
nothing in the case law that implies that criminalization of the employer’s conduct is 
the only requirement under human rights law. In fact, the Court said in Rantsev that 
‘the duty to penalise and prosecute trafficking is only one aspect of member States’ 
general undertaking to combat trafficking. The extent of the positive obligations 
arising under Article 4 must be considered within this broader context’. 105  An 
implication of Rantsev was the requirement that a very restrictive visa regime be 
abolished. 
To conclude this section, a clear implication of the association of the overseas 
domestic worker visas with situations of slavery concerns the state’s obligations. 
What needs to be done about overseas domestic workers? A return to the previous 
visa regime would be an essential first step. Domestic workers must have a right to 
change employers and remain in the UK. In order for them to be able to find new 
employment as domestic workers, they need to have a right to stay for long periods if 
                                                        
101  See the critique of trafficking policies in R. Andrijasevic and B. Anderson, ‘Anti-trafficking 
Campaigns: Decent? Honest? Truthful?’ (2009) 92 Feminist Rev. 151-155. 
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Exploitation in the Context of Sex Trafficking’ (2008) 35 J. of Law and Society 240-264; H. Shamir, 
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104 See further V. Mantouvalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights?’ (2012) 3 European Labour Law 
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employed, as they did before 2012. The ratification of the ILO Convention on 
Domestic Workers that contains many labour rights is also very important, both 
symbolically and practically. 
In the context of the Modern Slavery Bill, the House of Lords supported a legal 
provision that would empower domestic workers. Lord Hylton proposed Amendment 
72 which provided a number of legal protections, including a right to change 
employer and renew their visa for consecutive periods of twelve months. The 
Amendment was rejected by the House of Commons, however, which replaced it with 
a clause that gives domestic workers that have been formally identified as victims of 
trafficking or servitude a possibility of being granted a six-month visa as a domestic 
worker with no recourse to public funds. 106  Given the fear that these workers 
experience and the fact that almost none of them wishes to go to the authorities while 
their immigration status is not secure, it is unlikely that the new provision will help 
address their plight.107 
It should also be appreciated that a change in the law that would no longer tie the 
worker to a particular employer would not be sufficient without further safeguards in 
place; employers may be prepared to break the law, as some already do. One 
additional safeguard may be the provision and renewal of a special ID card or visa, 
which the employee will collect personally from the authorities, unaccompanied by 
their employers.108 A personal interview in this process can help review living and 
working conditions. Additionally, the requirement that the employers open a bank 
account in the sole name of the domestic worker and make payments in that bank 
account (rather than in cash) can also help guarantee that the worker is paid, and that 
the payment is in accordance with the law. 109  Other safeguards should include 
information and a contract in a language that the domestic worker can understand. 
Protections such as these can help a group of workers who are currently not only in a 
position of subordination typical of the employment relation, as Kahn-Freund 
famously argued,110 but in a state of true objectification. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Sometimes the obvious has to be stated. A liberal country must not condone situations 
of severe exploitation, it should not import situations of slavery and servitude, nor 
should it legislate in ways that trap workers in situations of abuse and exploitation. 
The sacrifice that the domestic worker in the introduction of this article believed that 
she had to make – sacrifice of the satisfaction of her basic needs in order to have a job 
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– is one that a liberal society should not tolerate.111 The experience reported by the 
workers interviewed in this study indicates that there is a need for reform of the law 
and for further effective safeguards to be in place. At the same time, there is scope for 
further research. For example, it is important to appreciate that there may be many 
other individuals that are affected by the regime. These people need to be reached. 
The role of the employment agencies that some of these workers said that they used 
when they migrated in the first place also needs to be further investigated. The type of 
safeguards that can effectively protect migrant domestic workers should be carefully 
considered and assessed. 
 
In 2014, the Committee on the Draft Modern Slavery Bill explained in relation to the 
ODW visa: ‘One of the factors that we found most distressing was that those that are 
contacted by these workers are now often unable to help as the victims are in effect 
tied to their employer’.112 The Committee recommended that the visa be reversed to 
the pre-2012 regime. 113  Following Lord Hylton’s proposed amendment, Marissa 
Begonia, co-ordinator of the self-help group Justice for Domestic Workers, reported 
that she received messages from domestic workers under the 2012 visa asking: ‘Am I 
free now?’.114 The answer is sadly no. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 opted to tolerate 
slavery. 
 
In response to criticisms of the overseas domestic worker visas, the Minister for 
Modern Slavery and Organised Crime said that the existing reports used small 
samples that are not representative.115 This response is unsatisfactory for two reasons. 
First, larger samples are not available for reasons that have to do with the nature of 
the work sector and the information that the government makes available on the visas, 
as explained earlier in this article. Second, crucially, the objectification through the 
law of even a few people, such as the migrant domestic workers that were interviewed 
in this study, is a situation that should not be tolerated or facilitated in a liberal state 
as a matter of principle. There is now enough evidence in place and a pressing need to 
address the problem.  
 
The single fear that interviewees that participated in this research unanimously voiced 
now that they are undocumented was a fear of the authorities, imprisonment and 
deportation. Their single hope was to become legal and be able to work in the UK for 
a period of time, in order to send some income to their dependents who are in 
desperate economic need. It is to be hoped that the immigration rules will soon be 
changed and this type of visa will not be reintroduced whenever there is a surge in 
anti-immigration sentiment. A liberal state must not tolerate slavery. It should, 
instead, protect the labour and human rights of domestic workers. 
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